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Overcoming the Dysfunction
of the Bifurcated Global System:
The Promise of a Peoples Assembly
Andrew L. Strauss

INTRODUCTION

ichard Falk and I have proposed that the time is
ripe for global civil society to take the lead and initiate a popularly representative Global Peoples
Assembly (GPA).1 The tremendous growth in the
commitment to, and practice of, democracy in
domestic settings2 juxtaposed against globalization's large-scale transfer of
political decision making to international institutions3 has made the almost
complete lack of democracy at the international level the most glaring anomaly
of the global system today.
Because states are unlikely to initiate the democratization of the international order, the task of beginning the drive for the first GPA necessarily falls
to civil society.4 In taking up this cause, civil society could employ various
strategies for bringing about such an assembly. For example, it could establish
an embryonic assembly composed of representatives of civil society organizations with the goal that this body evolve into a popularly elected assembly.
Alternatively, a very hopeful approach might be to enlist a relatively small core
of like-minded states to create a treaty-based electoral assembly to which other
countries could over time be persuaded to join. Falk and I have suggested that
with the help of any willing states civil society could itself organize elections
and establish the GPA. Quite clearly this strategy would entail overcoming formidable challenges. Civil society would have to come up with an institutional
mechanism that would be broadly accepted for establishing electoral districts
as well as campaign finance and other election rules. The fact that some of the
world's more authoritarian governments would almost certainly not allow
elections to occur in their countries would have to be dealt with. Until sufficient pressure could be brought to bear, probably after the assembly was well
established, citizens of these countries would most likely have to go unrepresented. In other seemingly more receptive countries, civil society would have
to guard against attempts to manipulate elections. Once the assembly was constituted, meeting facilities, translation services, office support personnel, and
other staff would have to be provided. All of this would call upon civil society
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recent successes in initiating global reform, Falk and I have suggested that 1t
has the potential (we hope with the help of receptive states) to carry out such a
project. 5
If a citizen-founded Global Peoples Assembly were in fact to become a
twenty-first century reality, it would not, of course, immediately transform
global governance. As the third section of this chapter will explain, i~ would
rather establish an institutional structure that would have the potential over
time to grow into a legislative body with accepted lawmaking powers. If such
an assembly were eventually to evolve into one with a significant legislative
role, global governance would likely be improved in several respects. In this
chapter I will, however, only explore how the assembly could help overcome
the most fundamental institutional dysfunctions of the current international
system. To function effectively, any community legal system must be able to
prescribe norms of behavior for the community.6 Once such norms are prescribed, the system should be structured so as not to discourage internal compliance,? and finally, the system should have the capacity to enforce its norms. 8
The international system in significant respects fails these most basic tests of
functionality.
At present, to a great extent in both theory and practice, elites who control
the mechanisms of state power can choose for their states not to be bound by
those international laws they do not wish it to be bound by, and even once
bound, such elites maintain the internal ability to organize their citizenry to
facilitate state noncompliance with the law when they deem it expedient. In
response the international system is by and large unable to take effective remedial action to enforce its norms against those individuals who are actually
responsible for causing international law violations. What all this means as a
practical matter is that those who control state power can on behalf of their
states often de jure or de facto opt out of community law.
In this chapter, I will trace the root of the dysfunction to what I call the
bifurcated global system, by which I mean the rigid division of the global system into two distinct polities, the domestic and the international. In place of
what, with the help of a directly representative assembly, could be an unmediated democratic connection between the global citizenry and the international
order, states at present intermediate this relationship. Not only does this result
in citizen access to international lawmaking power being channeled through
states, but correspondingly, with rare exception, states, at the expense of the
international order, maintain a captive monopoly on the legal obligations of
citizens. Instead of a seamless democratic global legal system where no one is
above the law, what results is a dysfunctional system that allows states to stand
in contravention of the law, a system, to paraphrase John Adams, of states and
not of laws. 9 Tracing the origins of this dysfunction of the international system
and understanding how a cure might be found in the promise of a Peoples
Assembly is the subject of what follows.

THE DYSFUNCTION
OF THE BIFURCATED GLOBAL SYSTEM AND
THE PROMISE OF THE GLOBAL PEOPLES ASSEMBLY
STATE INTERMEDIATION
AND THE BIFURCATED GLOBAL SYSTEM

The global system as presently structured relies on states to be intermediaries
between citizens and the international system. This means that the planet's six
billion citizens are not directly involved in creating international law, and the
international legal order, likewise, does not directly command their compliance with its laws. Because law, domestic or international, can only affect the
social order to the extent it influences the behavior of real human beings, the
process of both creating and complying with international law necessarily
must take place in two steps. With some recent qualification, I 0 if citizens wish
to influence the creation of international law, they must petition their own
government, which can, if it chooses, respond favorably to their appeal and
wor~ toward the creation of such law.
Once a state has agreed to a law, it must command real persons to do, or to
refrain from doing, whatever is necessary to bring itself into compliance with
the law. If states wish to establish an effective international regime banning the
production of ozone-harming chemicals, for example, they must first enter
into an agreement making such chemicals illegal under international law, and
then each must preclude the real individuals within its jurisdiction from producing such chemicals. Sometimes the demands might be upon individuals
who are acting as agents of the states either by direct employment or by commercial contract. For example, if two countries wish mutually to reduce their
stockpiles of nuclear weapons, they must first enter into an international legal
agreement among themselves to do so, and then each country must make the
requisite demands upon the individuals involved in their respective defense
establishments so that compliance with the agreement is achieved. Alternatively, if these two countries wish to agree to create a military alliance with each
other, they would enter into an international legal agreement and then command those individuals in their respective defense establishments to act in such
a way that the terms of the alliance were met.

THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY AND THE DYSFUNCTION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING SYSTEM

This bifurcated system, requiring states to intermediate between citizens and
the international order, is quite dysfunctional. It charges states with setting the
rules for the international system, II including the foundational rules that
determine the extent to which states are imposed upon to comply with community norms.12 States have used this power to further their ability to maintain
absolute discretion over the extent of their participation in the system. States,
or more precisely those who control state power, have done this by adopting a
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rule that allows each state to decide for itself which international laws it wishes
to be bound by.1 3 Thus, for example, a state is under no legal obligation to
agree to be bound by community laws that are necessary to the safety and wellbeing of the international community. Overtures by the international community to get states to join in pollution control, weapons elimination, or other
regimes that are vital to the interests of the global community can all be
rejected legally.
The implications of this for the international system are significant. Just as
would-be bank robbers are among the least likely citizens to agree voluntarily
to subject themselves to domestic laws proscribing bank robbery, those states
contemplating action contrary to an international law are the least likely to
assent to that law. For example, India's 1995 refusal to agree to be bound by the
nuclear nonproliferation treatyl4 might well have foretold its intention to
become the newest avowed nuclear power. IS When, after three years, this came
to pass, it precipitated a dangerous arms race in South Asia. 16
The problems caused by the ability of states to opt out of community
norms, however, go beyond the system's inability to extend the law to a limited
number of recalcitrant countries. Because treaties are often ineffective without
the participation of certain, and sometimes most, countries, a defiant minority
can effectively veto the introduction of treaties that are in the vital interest of
the world community. This is the practical, but reversible, effect of the United
States' refusal thus far to ratify the Kyoto Protocol,I7 the treaty that establishes
binding limits on greenhouse gases. 18 The failure to achieve this treaty could
have major adverse implication for the global climate, l9 but going forward with
a treaty makes no sense without participation by most countries and especially
the United States, which accounts for over twenty-five percent of the world's
greenhouse gases.20
To only focus on obvious failures-the refusal of individual states to accede
to international norms, or the potential for a minority of states to effectively
veto a treaty-is still to understate the dysfunctionality of the present system.
Given the intransigence that so many states exhibit in so many different types
of negotiations, when broad-based agreements capable of securing general
adherence are reached, it is often done at the cost of sacrificing a treaty's true
effectiveness. So riddled with ambiguities and exceptions or reservations, for
example, are conventions to protect women, such as the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women2l and the Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration,22 that these lowest common denominator
instruments are severely compromised in their effectiveness.
An effective Global Peoples Assembly would go a long way toward remedying this dysfunction of the international lawmaking system. The delegates to
the Global Peoples Assembly, unlike national elites who control the mechanisms of state power, would not have an interest in promoting unfettered discretion by states over whether or not they are to be bound by international
legal obligations. Therefore, as distinct from the current international legisla-

tive system controlled exclusively by states, a Global Peoples Assembly, committed to the rule of law, would be much more predisposed to proclaim a functional system of binding law that states could not opt out of. Supporting the
right of the assembly to issue such a proclamation and legitimizing it in the
pUblic mind would be the fundamental democratic principle that the ultimate
pOwer to create law flows from the consent of the governed, and that states do
not have the discretion to opt out of law that is authorized by the higher
authority of the citizenry.23 If the GPA were over time to become an accepted
part of the international lawmaking system, possibly integrated into an
expanded United Nations, such a proclamation could become accepted as a
fundamental legal precept of the international system. After all, what appears
so obvious in a domestic setting-that no functional legal system can give its
subjects the individual discretion to opt out of laws they do not like-should,
once officially proclaimed, come to appear obvious in the international setting
as well.
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THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY AND THE DYSFUNCTION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMPLIANCE SYSTEM

Once a state consents to be bound by an international law, it is obliged to follow that law. But here too, the system remains dysfunctional. Although states
at this point no longer have the legal right not to comply with community
norms, the bifurcated system is specifically designed to give them the practical
ability to do just that. Because states (with one significant emerging exception)24 continue to be the sole source of law applicable to citizens, they maintain the ability to mobilize their citizens to directly contravene their internationallegal obligations.
Securing institutional compliance with law is different from securing the
compliance of individuals because institutional action that is intended to be
either in conformity or not in conformity with the law is itself largely organized and coordinated through rules. 25 States wishing to maintain centralized
control over their compliance with international law must, therefore, come up
with some legal mechanism for coordinating the actions of their citizens in the
furtherance of directing either compliance or noncompliance with internationallaw. There are different doctrinal approaches used by states to accomplish this. The United States follows a particular application of what is called
dualism, which maintains-consistent with the bifurcation of the international system-that international law and domestic law are two totally distinct
systems of law.2 6 International law applies between states, and domestic law
applies within states. The American approach, however, provides that internationallaw is automatically incorporated into U.S. federal law so that it becomes
the law of the United StatesP This means that, in the normal course, when
political authorities desire for international law to be followed, they simply
allow for such incorporation. However, since U.S. domestic law holds that a
later-in-time federal law takes precedence over an earlier-in-time federallaw,28
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by passing legislation29 inconsistent with a previous international legal obligation, the United States political branches can effectively direct those subject to
its jurisdiction to violate international law.
Some other countries give internal precedence, to a greater or lesser extent,
to international law over their domestic law. Those that give precedence as a
general rule to international law are referred to as "monist:' All countries are
ultimately "dualist," however, in the sense that as a result of the bifurcated
international system, their own governing institutions (often their constitutions) are the ultimate determiners of which law will be given precedence. As
long as it remains the case that states maintain ultimate control over their own
internal compliance with international law, they will have the option of organizing their citizens so as to promote the violation of international law.
In a legal system organized to maximize law compliance, such an option
would not exist. For example, within the domestic realm, corporations are
somewhat analogous to states in the international realm in that each entity is
self-governed through a system of internal rules and yet operates within the
context of a larger community legal system. In all countries, however, the larger
community legal system attempts to secure the legal obedience of these corporate entities by imposing compliance obligations not only upon them but also
upon those employees who work within their structures. 30 Indeed, we would
regard it as quite illogical for the state to limit intentionally the effectiveness of
its ability to secure compliance with its mandates.
A Global Peoples Assembly would very likely improve the international
compliance system by extending the obligation to obey international law
directly to individuals. Unlike the national governing elites who, acting as
agents of their states, have colluded to maintain an international system
whereby their claims on citizen legal obligations are uncontested, a GPA dedicated to an effective system of law would be inclined to proclaim transnational
law to be binding on citizens. Correspondingly citizens who directly participate
in the international system would likely come to accept and even expect that
the law their assembly creates would apply directly to them.
To the extent such law actually comes to be generally accepted by citizens as
applicable, in what could be labeled "compliance from the inside out:' states
would lose the ability to mobilize their citizens in contravention of transnational
law. The old system would be turned on its head. States would no longer, as under
the bifurcated system, be the vehicle that must be relied upon to bring their citizens into compliance with international legal obligations. Instead, because states
are in effect the sum of their citizens, citizen compliance with international legal
obligations would necessarily result in state compliance as well.
THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY AND THE DYSFUNCTION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM

Not only does the bifurcated system facilitate the organizational ability of
states to break international law in the first instance, but it does not allow for

an effective remedial system of enforcement. Under the bifurcated system,
states rather than individuals are the exclusive subjects of international law, so
enforcement is with rare exception31 both against states and by states.
Enforcement against states takes several forms. The most far-reaching
enforcement powers are given to the United Nations Security Council under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.32 Under Chapter VII, the Security
Council has a right either to impose economic sanctions33 or use military
force 34 against a nation whenever it determines "the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."35 More narrowly focused
treaty organizations also have certain enforcement powers. For example, the
World Trade Organization (WTO) can authorize members to introduce retaliatory trade restrictions against other states that have violated one of the agreements enforceable by the WTO, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. 36 Other organizations, such as the International Labor Organization
(ILO), rely on criticizing the practices of countries, or what is sometimes
referred to as the "mobilization of shame;' in attempts to enforce their
normsY What these international enforcement practices all have in common,
however, is that the state itself is the unit upon which enforcement is targeted.
Such enforcement against an artificial person as complex and diffuse as a
state is both ineffective and violative of basic human rights. Elites who control
state power and can cause international law violations often personally benefit
or are responsive to those who personally benefit when their country violates
international law. Whether they or those to whom they are beholden actually
benefit, those elites are seldom forced to face personally the consequences of
their actions. If they hail from powerful states, their ability to mobilize the
machinery of their own state against international enforcers can remove the
possibility that any enforcement action will be taken or, if taken, that it can
have any significant affect on their state. Those individuals from less powerful
countries who cause violations usually fare as well. While their countries may
be the target of international enforcement action, with their social power
comes the capacity to insulate themselves from the effects of such action. This
seems particularly true in the more authoritarian countries where leaders can
successfully insulate themselves from the effects of negative public opinion.
Perversely, those who have little responsibility for engineering violations of
international law often bear the brunt of enforcement action. Obviously, this
significandy limits the deterrent effect of the international enforcement system. 38 In addition, collective punishment is contrary to accepted notions of
human rights. 39 Even for those who, inconsistendy with international law and
accepted notions· of justice, would have it that citizen passivity in the face of
violations of international law or even widespread acquiescence in following
the commands of the state calls for some type of collective responsibility, the
bifurcated compliance and enforcement systems taken together are internally
inconsistent. The compliance system, as I have discussed, makes no attempt to
pierce the veil of the state to extend its legal obligations to common citizens.
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Thus, citizens under the present system are in effect held collectively responsible for violating laws that they were not expected to comply with in the first
place.
Nowhere has the dysfunction of the international enforcement system
become more clear than in the United Nations Security Council-authorized
war and the ten-year-long sanctions regime against Iraq. Perhaps indicative of
the overall state of the international enforcement system, this is frequently
thought of as a great example of successful international enforcement because
Iraq was dislodged from Kuwait. 4o During the war, however, hundreds if not
thousands of Iraqi conscripts were killed,41 almost all of whom, of course, had
no role in the decision to invade Kuwait. While the Iraqi dictator is reported to
be profiting from smuggling opportunities made possible by the sanctions
regime 42 (which has been ineffective at meeting its political objectives),43 many
Iraqi children are reported to have died as a direct result of the sanctions. 44
Obviously, any enforcement system that systematically sanctions the innocent
rather than the infractors is both perversely unjust and deficient in promoting
law-abiding behavior.
Compounding the dysfunction of this system where enforcement is almost
entirely against states is the symmetrical reality that enforcement is almost
entirely by states. Under the bifurcated system, states largely stand between the
international order and the real persons whose activities are ultimately necessary to carry out enforcement measures. The international order only maintains direct but limited control over a small number of international civil servants composed mostly of technical specialists. For example, when the United
Nations Security Council takes action under Chapter VII, the organization
itself has no direct means of enforcing economic sanctions or applying force
against a country.45 Rather, it must rely upon its state members who are alone
capable of mobilizing citizens to carry out enforcement measures. In the Gulf
War Chapter VII action against Iraq, the United Nations Security Council
"authorized" what was effectively the United States, Britain, France, and Saudi
Arabia to "use all necessary means" to get Iraq out of Kuwait,46 and it is primarily American naval ships that have been enforcing the oil sanctions against
Iraq.47 Practical proposals to enhance the independent enforcement abilities of
the international order have mostly fallen on the deaf ears of states (particularly powerful states) committed to maintaining the prerogatives that come
with the strict bifurcation of the global order. 48
Under such a system, the imposition of enforcement measures becomes
highly politicized. In determining whether enforcement measures will actually
be imposed against an infractor, such legitimate considerations as the severity
of a violation, the future danger posed by the infractor, or its past incorrigibility are weighed against the geopolitical and other interests of would-be enforcing states. Strategic alliances, business considerations, the ethnic identifications
of domestic constituencies, and the general diplomatic and military power of
the infractors can individually or collectively conspire to preclude enforcement

in any given case. Not only does the politicization of the enforcement system
compromise enforcement in individual cases, but to the extent states can predict that no action will be taken against them, the enforcement system loses its
ability to deter violations. Perhaps most importantly, such politicization
undermines the perception that law rather than politics guides the international enforcement system, greatly frustrating the creation of an international
ethic of respect for the rule of law.
An empowered Global Peoples Assembly could remedy both of these dysfunctions. If, as suggested, a GPA dedicated to the creation of a fully functional
international system were to extend the obligation to comply with transnational law directly to individuals, presumably it would correspondingly provide that that law be enforced against them as well. Then, in accordance with
principles of fairness and deterrence, those actually responsible for law-breaking would themselves be the target of legal sanctions, and the ability of states to
mobilize their citizens in contravention of the law would be further eroded. In
addition, with a GPA, enforcement would no longer have to be dependent
upon the vacillating willingness of states to undertake enforcement action.
Over time, an empowered GPA would have the potential to directly authorize
an international infrastructure to enforce international law directly. While
visions of a standing army come to mind, this would be by far the most controversial enforcement mechanism that might come to be considered by the GPA.
Most direct enforcement would be far more everyday and mundane. Armies of
bureaucrats rather than soldiers would be the most likely to be marshaled and
would in many ways provide a far more effective and hopeful vision for the
future. To the extent that the bifurcated structure of the international order
begins to break down and international law comes to be directly enforced
against citizens, the state will begin to lose its ability to break international law.
With the growth of a more law-abiding world, it is to be hoped that standing
armies will become a much less prominent feature of the global architecture.
FULFILLING THE PROMISE: THE EMPOWERMENT
OF THE GLOBAL PEOPLES ASSEMBLY

It is, of course, one matter for a citizen-created Global Peoples Assembly to
proclaim internationally prescribed regulation to be binding, applicable to citizens, and directly enforceable on citizens by international institutions. It is
quite another matter for such proclamations to become institutional reality. To
counter the impression that the creation of an assembly-led seamless global
legal system, while perhaps desirable, is purely in the realm of the utopian, I
will now explain how such a transformation could over time become a reality.
As Richard Falk and I explain elsewhere,49 the ideological underpinnings of
the global political order were at one time based upon the divine right of kings.
The bifurcation of the international order arose because monarchs who personified the state were thought to be the fundamental repository of all worldly
political authority. Under this conceptual structure monarchs were empowered
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to lord over their subjects below and to become the exclusive progenitors of the
inter-state order above. As a result of a fundamental paradigm shift that has
occurred, beginning over two hundred years ago, however, political authority is
no longer thought to come directly from an absolutist ruler. 50 Rather, people
today increasingly accept the notion that political authority comes from the
citizens who are called upon to validate political leadership through periodic
elections. 51 While the state maintains its role as the final political authority,
what is different is that this authority is now delegated from its ultimate source,
the citizenry. This means that if citizens were to circumvent the state and themselves create an elected transnational authority to which they would directly
delegate certain transnational powers, the state could no longer lay ideological
claim to be the sole source of all international political authority. For the first
time, an international institution would have a basis of authority separate from
that which has been derived from the consent of states.
The Global Peoples Assembly's democratic foundation, however, would not
immediately translate into the kind of binding powers that would end the dysfunction of the international system. Traditional political and bureaucratic
structures reinforcing state power and the established notion that international
law is created by states would not automatically transform themselves with the
mere realization of the Global Peoples Assembly. Rather, at first the assembly as
a nongovernmental institution would likely be regarded, at least within official
circles, as only empowered to issue unofficial and nonbinding resolutions and
declarations. In what Falk and I refer to as the "socio-political and ideological
dynamics of empowerment:' however, the assembly would hopefully come to
achieve its democratic potential. 52
What we mean by sociopolitical empowerment are those social and political
dynamics that would be unleashed by the existence of the assembly and would
enhance its ultimate ability to command authority. This process of sociopolitical empowerment would begin with the first elections. Born amidst the publicity that would result from worldwide citizen participation in elections and
uniquely capable of speaking in the name of the global citizenry, the assembly
would act as a magnet drawing organized interests with globally oriented policy agendas into its field. Civil society organizations, in particular those that, as
I have mentioned, have been frustrated in their attempts to participate in the
state-centric international system, would likely take advantage of the democratic opportunity afforded by such an assembly. By lobbying the GPA to
endorse their positions formally, these organizations would force states and
others with opposing policy goals to either concede the legitimacy afforded by
the only popularly elected global body or to themselves competitively engage
its processes.
Our experience of parliamentarian ism writ large tells us that as transnational
citizen groups organize to petition the assembly directly, they would form coalitions with other like-minded citizen groups for the purpose of more effectively
challenging other similarly coalescing groupS.53 As the organized citizenry
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increasingly came to find the Global Peoples Assembly useful as its forum for
resolving political conflict of a global nature and achieving a workable social
consensus, the center of political gravity would gradually shift in favor of the
GPA. Allowed for the first time to participate in the international lawmaking
process directly, the organized citizenry would tend to become institutionally
committed to the Assembly and invested in its legislative product.
.....
<C
III
The citizenry at large would as well tend to be drawn into the assembly's
o.....
field. The need for candidates for the assembly to appeal to the electorate would
naturally incorporate it into the global system. Discussions that once were cono
.......
sidered the elite province of foreign relations specialists and in which citizens
<C
u
could at best participate indirectly at the national level would be as a matter of
..:
=>
course broadened to incorporate the newly enfranchised citizenry as a whole.
...
III
Still, this political vitality would not in itself mean that the assembly would gain
the power to create binding law applicable and enforceable in the ways called
...
for in this chapter. This would potentially result, however, from the addition of
o
what Falk and I call the ideological dynamic of empowerment, the acceptance
z
o
of the assembly's democratic claim to exercise legal authority by those existing
....
u
institutions that are themselves imbued with formal lawmaking powers.54
z
=>
Domestic courts are the most obvious of such institutions. Certainly at least
...
a few pioneering litigants with the institutional backing of the assembly's sup>o
porters, or simply because such arguments would be helpful to their cause,
...:J:
would begin to cite the assembly's directives as authoritative. On the pages of
....
law journals, academic supporters of the assembly could be counted on to proz
vide the rationale for this position by applying globally the familiar arguments
:e
o
supporting the legal powers of democratic assemblies. If the assembly were in
u
.....:>
fact gaining the institutional allegiance of the citizenry, some of the bolder proo
gressive judges in open societies would be tempted to be among the first to
accept this democratic 10gic. 55 To the extent judicial acceptance were to occur,56
the ideological coherence underlying the doctrine of dualism would be eroded,
and with such erosion the state's political authorities would lose from within
their absolute control over the state's ability to violate international law.
Other lawmaking institutions could as well help solidify the assembly's de
jure legislative authority. Acceptance of the assembly's powers by international
courts and tribunals would put pressure on state executive and political decision makers to recognize the assembly's authority. Further pressure could come
from the assembly's efforts to lobby governments on its own behalf as well as
from a GPA-organized international plebiscite putting approval of the assembly's powers to the global citizenry.
Some national parliaments or their equivalents might unilaterally accept the
assembly's powers. However, the definitive event would be when states, the primary entities with a rival claim to power, act collectively to formally recognize
the assembly's legislative authority. This could be done by way of a treaty officially defining the assembly's powers as part of the overall constitutional structure of the United Nations system of global governance. This, of course, would
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not happen solely as a result of the compelling logic in favor of the assembly's
democratic authority, but rather out of an acceptance of a new political reality
that sees citizens increasingly coming together to resolve political conflict and
achieve social consensus within the framework of the Global Peoples Assembly.
As this citizen heart of pluralist decision making migrates in the direction of
the Global Peoples Assembly, governments would only be acknowledging a
reality over which they had little direct control.
If a Global Peoples Assembly were to be established at the instigation of civil
society, it is, of course, impossible to know if it would develop in the ways suggested. Much would depend upon serendipity and the competence and
integrity of the representatives who came to be identified with the assembly.
There are historical reasons, however, to be optimistic that the dynamics I have
suggested would play themselves out in ways that would empower the assembly. After all, the venerable English Parliament began as but an advisory body
to the Crown. Nevertheless, as the democratic ideal took hold its status as the
representative of the people secured its eventual supremacy. Moreover, in our
own time there is indeed precedent for a transnational assembly along the lines
of a GPA. The directly elected European Parliament, although once a largely
symbolic representative of the peoples of the European Union, has today
attained significant law making powers.57 What is more, it is the national governments of the European Union that have acted primarily on their own initiative to create and strengthen that institution.
Perhaps the most significant force that would propel the eventual empowerment of a GPA is the sheer need for such an organization. The global system is
dysfunctional, and as globalization proceeds, the need to find transnational
solutions to once local problems continues to accelerate. 58 As the recent
protests in Seattle have made clear,59 citizens are increasingly unlikely to continue willingly to allow themselves to be excluded from the global decisionmaking process. Political and commercial elites attempting to solve global regulatory problems are, therefore, increasingly likely themselves to come to
accept the need for some kind of innovation along the lines of the GPA.
If indeed a GPA does come to pass, and if its authority is to evolve in accordance with some rough approximation of what has been described, then over
time, it could carry out what has been called for in this chapter as necessary to
overcome the dysfunction of the international system: make international laws
that are binding, applicable to citizens, and directly enforceable on citizens.
CONCLUSION

Some will regard the ability of a popularly elected Global Peoples Assembly to
seriously remedy the major dysfunctions of the international system as a hopelessly utopian dream. I have done my best to respond. Others, however, might
come to the opposite conclusion. They might see the GPA as a potentially dangerous Leviathan paving the way toward world domination. In concluding, I
would like to briefly address this concern.

A word of qualification is first in order. It is far beyond the scope of this
chapter to suggest in any detail the structure of a Global Peoples Assembly.
While future academic works exploring alternative models would be useful, the
ultimate framework for a GPA must, of course, be determined by democratic
process, and at any rate, as the analysis in this chapter makes clear, a GPA born
of citizen initiative would very much be a constitutional work-in-progress. The
role it would eventually settle into playing in the overall global order would not
be known for many years.
Having said all this, to propose a Global Peoples Assembly endowed with
certain lawmaking powers is not the same as to suggest an all-powerful sovereignlike organization. Such a model would likely be unacceptable to just about
everyone. The template that would achieve the most support would likely be
drawn from some sort of federalist or confederalist model. In accordance with
what the Europeans call "subsidiarity"-the principle by which decisions are
made as closely as possible to the citizen6°-the assembly's powers would be
limited in such a way as to protect autonomy over national matters.6 1 Indeed,
such deference to internal affairs is the vision presently endorsed by Article 2,
Section 7 of the United Nations Charter. 62 Likewise, given the present commitment to international human rights, the international community is likely to
insist that an empowered assembly be limited by the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. 63 How these rights would be enforced as well as the GPA's relationship with the United Nations and other international organizations and
tribunals would all have to be determined.
Would there be any absolute guarantees that despite the best of intentions
such an assembly would not help pave the way toward a consolidation of power
that could be fundamentally threatening to freedom? Probably not. However, it
seems clear from political theory, experience at the national level, and indeed
common sense that democratic outcomes are most likely to proceed from
democratic structures. In addition to any structural checks and balances established, the assembly's legitimacy would be grounded in popular democracy
and its usefulness as a forum for pluralist decision making rather than loyalty
to a sovereign, an authoritarian ideology, or nationalism. Such an institution
would be difficult to convert to authoritarian ends without losing the normative command over citizen legal obligations upon which, as previously discussed, the institution's authority ultimately depends.
That the present international order is, in contrast, not structured to allow
for democratic participation has been the basic premise of this chapter. What
may be less obvious, however, is the extent to which the bifurcated system is
configured to allow authoritarian governance to persist at the national level. In
the first place, national governments, whether they be democratic or not, continue in their role as the ultimate and exclusive focal points for citizens' legal
obligations. Even to the extent that national governments come to embody the
democratic spirit, such a bifurcated system of discrete democracies channels
citizen legal obligations so that state-defined societies are structurally juxta-
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posed to each other. Coercion of one society by another ultimately backed by
the ever-present threat (and often use) of military violence is an inherent feature of this bifurcated structure. Such architecture is, of course, the antithesis
of seamless democratic governance which results when an integrated democratic structure is designed to protect the rights and security of everyone. To
make matters worse, in truth even the best of discrete democracies cannot
enjoy an insulated fully functional democratic existence. The democratic
health of every society will be to some extent compromised by national security concerns as long as the bifurcated system predetermines an ever-present
threat from other societies.
On balance, therefore, it seems far more likely that a democratic future will
be attained with the implementation of democratic structures at the internationallevel than without. As this chapter has suggested, the bifurcated system
that provides that states be the ultimate focus of citizen's legal obligations is a
remnant from a previous era when absolutist national rulers were accepted as
divinely mandated with supreme and absolute power. In the modern democratic view it is commonly held that within states political power at all levels of
governance must directly involve the citizenry. It is time these basic democratic
principles were applied to the international order. As more political decision
making takes place within the confines of the undemocratic international
order, to continue to leave this anomaly unchallenged is to lose ground in the
quest for democracy and to see the dysfunction of the bifurcated system
become increasingly debilitating.
NOTES

"

1. See Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, "On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly:
Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty;' Stanford Journal of International
Law, 36, 2000, 191ff. (hereafter "On the Creation"). See also Richard Falk and Andrew
Strauss, "Globalization Needs a Dose of Democracy," International Herald Tribune,

October 5, 1999, 8; Andrew Strauss and Richard Falk, "For a Global Peoples Assembly,"
International Herald Tribune, November 14, 1997,8; and Andrew Strauss and Richard
Falk, "All That Dough," Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 12, 1997,7.
2. Over the last thirty years there has been a significant global trend toward democratization. It started in southern Europe in the mid-1970s, engulfed Latin America in the
1980s, and expanded to many parts of Asia, the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe,
and Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s. According to Freedom House, 117 countries-more than sixty percent of the world's states-are now, at least in a qualified
sense, democratic. See Adrian Karatnycky, 'The Comparative Survey of Freedom
1998-1999: A Good Year for Freedom;' in Freedom House: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1998-1999 (New York: Freedom House, 1999), 1, 3.
Reporting on and interpreting this trend toward democracy has not surprisingly been a
major theme among commentators. Receiving perhaps the most notoriety has been
Harvard poHtical scientist Samuel Huntington, who, in 1993, introduced the concept of
waves of democratic expansion and surveyed the advance of democracy around the
world. See generally Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the
Late Twentieth Century, Julian J. Rothbaum Distinguished Lecture Series, Vol. 4 (Uni-

versity of Oklahoma Press, 1993). At about the same time, a related work by Thomas
Franck received a great deal of attention within the international law community.
Franck, the recently retired president of the American Society of International Law, celebrated this trend toward democratization by suggesting that international law was in
the process of evolving a right to democratic governance. See Thomas M. Franck, 'The
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," American Journal of International Law 86,
1992. While the global trend toward democratization heralded by Huntington and
Franck continues, or certainly has not lost significant ground, scholars have more
recently begun to give greater emphasis to the frailties of existing democratic systems
and the potential limits on the further expansion of democracy. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1996) (asserting that democratic expansion is limited by its connection
to Western cultures); Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs,
Nov.!Dec. 1997, 22 (observing that despite electoral validation, many governments
maintain authoritarian systems of administration); Thomas Carothers, "Democracy
without Illusions," Foreign Affairs, Jan.!Feb. 1997,85 (discussing the countermovement
away from democracy).
3. Many observers perceive this evolution of power to the international order. For some
important works, see Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: the Diffusion of Power in
the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),49 (arguing that
state power is giving way to the power of global institutions and multinational corporations); Christoph Schreuer, "The Waning of the Sovereign State: Toward a New Paradigm for International Law?" European Journal of International Law, 4, 1993,447,451
(discussing the increasing independence from their state constituents of such international organizations as the World Health Organization, the International Monetary
Fund, and the World Trade Organization); Robert J. Holton, Globalization and the
Nation-State (London: Palgrave, 1998), 50-79 (noting the evolution toward transnational networks and regulatory arrangements) .
4. Now surfacing are several preliminary but important citizen efforts to create an institution similar to wnat we are calling the Global Peoples Assembly. Out of Perugia, Italy,
an initiative called the Assembly of the United Nations of Peoples has attempted to
organize civil society organizations into a quasi-representative assembly. In 1998, with
civil society organizations from one hundred countries in attendance, it had its third
assembly. Similarly significant is the Global Peoples Assembly Movement, which had its
inaugural meeting in Samoa in April 2000. Like the Perugia initiative, this movement's
purpose is to create an ongoing institutional structure that would allow the global citizenry to have an effective voice in global governance. The civil society organization,
Citizen Century, launched a major effort to begin an organizational drive to link all the
national parliamentarians of the world together over the Internet into a voting body. In
addition, a major discussion is currently going on within the World Federalist Association on whether it should return to its roots and itself participate in an organizing drive
for a Global Peoples Assembly. Perhaps most important, and linking all of these initiatives, was the Millennium NGO Forum. At the invitation of the United Nations Secretary General, representatives of hundreds of civil society organizations convened in
May at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. One of the primary stated goals
of the forum was "to create an organizational structure whereby peoples of the world
can participate effectively in global decision-making." The forum's outcome was
reported on by the Secretary General at the special millennial assembly of states which
examined the future architecture of the global system of governance.
5. See Falk and Strauss, "On the Creation."
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See Donald Black, The Behavior o/Law (New York: Academic Press, 1976), 105-121.
[bid., 61-83.
Ibid., 86.
See John Adams, Papers ofJohn Adams, volume 2, edited by Robert J. Taylor et al. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977),314.
Nongovernmental organizations, often now referred to as civil society organizations,
are increasingly attempting to bypass the nation-state and participate directly at the
international level. For further discussion, see generally Peter J. Spiro, "New Global
Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision-Making
Institutions:' Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995,45; Dianne Otto, "Nongovernmental
Organizations in tlle United Nations System: The Emerging Role of International Civil
Society," Human Rights Quarterly, 18, 1996, 107; Dinah Shelton, "The Participation of
Non-Governmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings:' American
Journal of International Law, 88, 1994. While international organizations have been
reluctantly and tentatively opening their doors to citizen organizations, within the logic
of the present international system, constituted as a community of states rather than
citizens, there is no clear structural role for citizen organizations to play.
The dominant view is that under the bifurcated international legal system, internationallaw emanates from the general consent of states. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, "International Law: Politics, Values and Functions," Recueil des COUTS 216, 1989, 46 (proclaiming that "[iJnter-state law is made, or recognized, or accepted, by the 'will' of
States. Nothing becomes law for the international system from any other source"). This
view, while generally endorsed by those who control the mechanisms of state power,
has been contested. See Myres McDougal et al., Studies in World Public Order, New
Haven Studies in International Law and World Public Order, no. 1 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1960); Richard Fa\k, Law in an Emerging Global Village: A Post-Westphalian Perspective (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1998).
See Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995), 11-13 (explaining why the international community of states as a "rule
community" has created its own process for making and applying rules and resolving
disputes about their meaning).
Generally speaking, states have accepted the view that they are only bound by those
international laws to which they agree, either explicitly by treaty or impliedly by customary practice. This statement, however, draws upon a long tradition of discussion
and debate and is subject to some qualification. First, in regard to customary internationallaw, states have traditionally maintained that they are only bound by customary
laws that they accept. The generally accepted requirement, however, for manifesting a
lack of consent ("the persistent objector rule") demands that states declare their intention not to be bound by a customary law at the time of the formation of the law. For a
variety of reasons, this is sufficiently unlikely to happen that, practically speaking, most
of the time states are considered bound by customary international law. Second, and
more fundamentally, there has been an increasing, although seldom articulated, trend
toward viewing customary international law as binding on even tllOse states that have
stated a desire not to be bound based upon a subtle shift to the notion that a general
consensus among states binds all states. For further discussion, see J. Patrick Kelly, "The
Twilight of Customary International Law," Virginia Journal of International Law, 40,
2000, 449. Most states, however, do not seem to accept this view.
Treaties are to an ever greater extent replacing customary international law as the
primary source of legal obligations on states. Whether a state wishes to adhere to a
treaty is, under the state-created rules of the international system, always voluntary.

Here, however, some qualification is also in order. While a state always has the legal
option to resist a treaty, as a practical matter, in certain cases diplomatic pressure may
be such that a state actually has little option but to accept a treaty. For a discussion of
this problem, see Robert Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations;' International Organization, 40,1986,1.
The final qualification to the absolute ability of states to opt out of international law
is that most states seem to accept that in certain very limited cases fundamental international norms can apply to states that do not in any way consent to be bound by them.
They hold that, regardless of consent, states can be bound by natural law (some concept of absolute right) not to engage in certain basic wrongs. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Article 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 334 (1969)
(providing that a treaty is "void if ... it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general
international law"). Peremptory norms are probably inclusive of core human rights
standards. See Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (jus cogens) in International Law:
Historical Development, Criteria, Present Status, Part III (Philadelphia: Coronet Books,
1988).
14. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July I, 1968,
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. In 1995, India refused to agree to an extension of the
nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Almost all of the nonnuclear weapons states have
joined the nonproliferation treaty, which requires them to remain nonnuclear. The five
nuclear weapons states party to the treaty have accepted the treaty's requirements that
they eventually eliminate their nuclear weapons. Only India, Pakistan, Israel, and Cuba
have not joined the global regime. Cuba is not thought to have nuclear weapons. Israel
does, but has not declared itself to be a nuclear weapons state. Only India and Pakistan
have tested nuclear weapons and declared their nuclear status.
15. By using India's failure to adhere to the extension of the nuclear nonproliferation
treaty, I do not mean to imply that India's arguments against the treaty were without
validity. India argued that there had, in fact, not been a good faith effort on the part of
the nuclear powers to meet the treaty's nuclear disarmament requirement and that the
treaty, therefore, acted to legitimize a discriminatory state of affairs. India was particularly concerned that China, with whom it shares a border and a history of tension, continued to retain such weapons.
16. In May 1998, India conducted nuclear weapons tests and declared itself to be a nuclear
weapons state. Fifteen days later, rival Pakistan, claiming it had no other strategic
choice but to follow India's lead, conducted its own series of tests and also declared
itself a nuclear power. For further discussion of the implications of this for regional and
global security, see Strobe Talbott, "Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia;' Foreign
Affairs, MarchI April, 1999, 110; "The Most Dangerous Place on Earth?" Economist, May
22,1999,5.
17. Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference Parties, 3rd sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. FCCCICP/1997/L.7/Add. 1 (1997),
reprinted in International Legal Materials 37, 1998,22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
My assertion that the United States is acting to "veto" the Kyoto Protocol needs
some explanation. In December 1997, the United States joined 150 other countries in
Kyoto, Japan, under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change to finalize
negotiations over an agreement to provide for mandatory reductions in greenhouse
gases. After difficult negotiations, a final agreement was reached tl1at provided a comprehensive plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions between 2008 and 2012. Developed countries are required by the protocol to reduce emissions significantly below
1990 levels; however, the requirements for developing countries are far less stringent.
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President Bill Clinton signed the protocol. Strong opposition to the treaty, however,
developed
within the United States Senate because of stated concerns over the lack of
...
"meaningful participation" by developing countries and the impact of the treaty on the
1/1
U.S. economy. President Clinton, therefore, did not present the treaty to that body for
1/1
:::I
ratification, and instead attempted to negotiate with developing countries so that they
«
might assume greater responsibility for the reduction of greenhouse gases. When Pres...1/1""
ident George W. Bush took office, he unconditionally rejected the Kyoto Protocol.
While most other countries have also not yet ratified the convention, their reluctance has not principally been opposition to the treaty but a desire to see what would
...J:
happen in the United States. While it is certainly too soon to say that the United States
o""
z
has permanently defeated the treaty, and an ultimately stronger treaty with increased
«
developing country participation might emerge, it is not clear that the U.S. Senate,
unless ideologically reconstituted, will ever ratify the treaty. Certainly the United States
is causing a delay in the full implementation of measures necessary to deal with the
problem of global warming.
18. For an overview of the Kyoto Protocol, see Claire Breidenich et al., "The Kyoto Protocol
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change," American Journal
of International Law, 92,1998,315.
19. See generally T. Houghton et al., eds., Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; World Meteorological Organization/United
Nations Environment Programme Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
1990). For a technical examination of the problem of global warming, see S. George
Philander, Is the Temperature Rising? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998);
Ed Ayres, God's Last Offer: Negotiating for a Sustainable Future (New York: Four Walls
Eight Windows, 1999) .
20. See Mike Dunn, "Conference to Affect State: Nations Will Gather to Discuss Global
Warming:' Solutions, The Advocate, Nov. 30, 1997, lB. Realizing this, the protocol's
drafters provided that the protocol needs to be ratified by fifty-five parties representing
at least fifty-five percent of global carbon emissions in order to come into force. See
Kyoto Protocol, Article 24 .
21. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened
for signature, March 1, 1980, G.A. Res. 341180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at
193, U.N. Doc.A/34/46 (1979), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, reprinted in International Legal Ma terials
19 (33) (1980) (entered into force on Sept. 3, 1981). This convention has had a particularly
large number of reservations. See William Schabas, "Reservations to the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child:' William and Mary Journal of Women & Law, 3, 1997, 79.
22. Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work
of Equal Value (ILO Convention No. 100), June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303. The language of the convention is so hedged that states are not bound to much of anything.
See especially Article 2.
23. Of course, this is not to imply that a claimed right of the assembly to impose law should
or would be without limitations. Such a claimed power of the assembly to create or
participate in creating binding law would only be likely to be accepted to the extent that
it was constitutionally limited to matters within the proper scope of international decision making.
24. Following World War II, the notion that at least certain international human rights and
humanitarian norms apply not just to states, but also to individuals, began to gain
acceptance. The watershed events were the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials and convictions of individuals for wartime violations of international humanitarian and human
o

o

.

rights law. See, e.g., Trial of War Criminals' Indictment 23, Department of State Publication no. 2420, 1945; Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945,59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. 472; "International
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment and Sentences," American Journal of International Law, 41, 1947, 172. In the last several years, the principle that certain international humanitarian and human rights laws apply directly to individuals has come
closer to becoming an enforceable reality. First, in 1993, the United Nations Security
Council established an International Criminal Court at The Hague to try Balkan
human rights and war crimes suspects. The Security Council followed in 1994 by
establishing an affiliated court in Arusha to try Rwandan human rights and war crimes
suspects. Both courts are presently in operation. See generally Louise Arbour, "History
and Future of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda;' American University International Law Review, 13, 1998, 1495. Later, in the
summer of 1997 in Rome a United Nations conference of states approved a draft convention to establish for the first time a permanent international criminal court. Upon
ratification by sixty countries the convention will go into effect. See generally Mahnoush Arsanjani, "Developments in International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court;' American Journal of International Law, 93, 1999, 22.
Because of strong lobbying by the international human rights community (see Falk
and Strauss, "On the Creation") and the horror and significantly destabilizing effects of
the acts proscribed, the international community, with some major holdouts is in the
process of providing an institutional mechanism for certain international criminal laws
to be applied directly to citizens. Countries are, however, for the reasons discussed in
this chapter, very unlikely to expand the scope of the applicability of international law
to individuals beyond this narrow subject area.
25. See Abram Chayes, "An Inquiry into the Working of Arms Control Agreements," Harvard Law Review, 85, 1972, 90S, 968; Fred IIde, How Nations Negotiate (New York:
Praeger, 1964),8. Cf. Roger Fisher, "Bringing Law to Bear on Governments," Harvard
Law Review, 74,1961,1130.
26. Consistent with the bifurcation of the global system, both the domestic and international orders have their own separate bodies of law, and each has its own distinctive
law-applying institutions. International law is created by states through procedures
that manifest their consent either explicitly through treaties or implicitly through customary practice. See note 13. Domestic law, on the other hand, comes exclusively from
the domestic system. In the United States, Congress, state legislatures, administrative
agencies, and courts, to name a few, are all lawmaking institutions. International legal
problems are largely resolved through international dispute resolution mechanisms,
such as diplomacy, international arbitration, or the International Court of Justice,
while domestic legal problems are thought to be largely resolved in national legal institutions, most notably domestic courts. See J. G. Starke, "Monism and Dualism in the
Theory of International Law;' British Year Book of International Law, 17, 1936,66,68;
Josef L. Kunz, "The 'Vienna School' and International Law," New York University Law
Review, II, 1934,370,399; Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd ed., edited
by Robert W. Tucker (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1966) 446-447.
27. See 'The Paquete Habana," 175 U.S. (1900),677,700 ("[Ilnternationallaw is part of
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for
tl1eir determination"). Not all international law, however, is incorporated into United
States law. Only what are called "self-executing" treaties and other "self-executing"
international agreements, as well as customary international law that is appropriate for
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application by domestic courts, are incorporated. All other international law is limited
to application in international fora. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, Section 111 (3) and commentary c (American Law Institute,
1987).
28. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Supremacy Clause of the United States COl)stitution (U.S. Const. Article VI, Section 2) to support the equal status of self-executing
treaties and statutes and consequently has endorsed application of the later-in-time
rule. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1887) ("By the Constitution, a tr~aty
is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation .
Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no sll.perior efficacy is given to either over the other. When the two relate to the same subject,
the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can
be done without violating the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the
one last in date will control the other ...").
While the Constitution does not directly address the matter, and there is no case law
directly on the point, it is most consistent with the overall framework for the American
application of international law described in the text that the later-in-time rule should
also apply to customary international law. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Section 115, reporter's note 4 ("arguably later customary
law should be given effect as law of the United States, even in the face of earlier la\\l");
see also Louis Henkin, "International Law as Law in the United States," Michigan l.aw
Review, 82, 1984, 1555, 1562-1564 (customary international law should be given
authority equal to United States federal law).
29. The extent to which the president acting on his own authority can witl1in this American compliance structure command citizens to act contrary to international law
remains unclear. Authority for him to do so has been read into the Supreme Court's
dictum that courts will give effect to international law "where tl1ere is no treaty, and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision." The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 1900,677,700 (emphasis added). But see Louis Henkin, "The Constitution and
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny," 100 Harvard Law Review, 100, 1987, 853, 879. "Unlike Congress, the President has no general
authority to make law that might compete with international law as law of the United
States. The President's duty is to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,' a dllty
that applies to international law as well as to other law of the land." Ibid.
30. In addition to the fact that in every domestic legal system individuals are always personally obligated to follow the law, as agents of a corporation or otherwise, the American legal system, for example, has developed several additional ways of enhancing the
power of the external law to encourage compliance by real persons operating wiiliin
ilie corporate structure. For example, racketeering laws can be used to impose extra
severe penalties for committing a crime on behalf of an organization. In addition,
managers can be held strictly liable under, for example, certain federal environmental
laws for the workplace violation of those laws by subordinate employees. See generally
Joseph G. Block and Nancy A. Voison, "The Responsible Corporate Officer DoctrineCan You Go to Jail for What You Don't Know?" Environmental Law, 22,1992,1347. This
principle of strict liability for corporate managers was upheld by the U.S. Supreme
Court in United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), and United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. 277 (1943). Likewise, the American system allows shareholders to sue directors
derivatively to enjoin action in, or recover damages for, violation of law. See Miller v.
AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that the business judgment rule cannot
insulate directors from liability for criminal acts).

34.
35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

See note 24.
U.N. Charter, Articles 31-51.
Ibid., Article 41.
Ibid., Article 42.
Ibid., Article 39. Article 39 reads in its entirety as follows: "The Security Council shall
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 [relating to economic sanctions and severance of diplomatic relations] and 42 [relating to military force], to maintain or restore international
peace and security."
If the WTO's dispute resolution system determines a party to be in violation of an
agreement governed by the WTO and that party refuses to comply with that determination or pay compensation to the aggrieved party, then the aggrieved party "may
request authorization from the [Dispute Settlement Body] to suspend the application
to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements." Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Article 22, Paragraph 2, Apr. 15, 1994; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, International Legal Materials, 33,1994,1125.
See Constitution of the International Labor Organization, June 28, 1919, Articles 3 and
4, 49 Stat. 2712, revised through Oct. 9, 1946; 62 Stat. 3485, T.LA.S. No. 1868, 15
U.N.T.S. 35, amended, June 25,1953; 7 U.S.T. 245, T.LA.S. No. 3500, 191 U.N.T.S. 143,
amended, June 22,1962; 14 U.S.T. 1039, T.LA.S. No. 5401, 466 U.N.T.S. 323, amended,
June 22, 1972; 25 U.S.T. 3253, T.LA.S. No. 7987. The main elements of the ILO supervisory machinery that allow for such critical oversight include the following: (1) a
reporting system that requires for states that have ratified conventions to provide regular reports on their implementation (Articles 19,22); (2) "special constitutional procedures" allowing associations of workers or employers (Article 24) or other states (Article 26) to file complaints against states for failing to implement ratified conventions,
and procedures for investigating and reporting on such complaints (Articles 27-30)
and (3) the ILO's procedures for freedom of association which provides for the investigation of interferences with the rights of workers to organize (Articles 24-30) . For further discussion, see generally Virginia A. Leary, "Lessons from the Experience of the
International Labour Organisation:' The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical
Appraisal, edited by Philip Alston (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 580; Nicolas Valticos and Geraldo von Potobsky, International Labour Law, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht: Kluwer,
1995). It should be noted that, germane to our discussion, the ILO is unique among
international organizations in that citizen groups, specifically labor unions and industry associations, are along with states officially represented in what is referred to as its
tripartite structure. Human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 6 LL.M. 368, also employ a similar type of supervisory system
as a way of "mobilizing shame" to secure enforcement. See generally Anne Fagan Ginger, "The Energizing Effect of Enforcing a Human Rights Treaty:' DePaul Law Review,
42, 1993, 1341.
Trade sanctions authorized by the World Trade Organization (see note 36) are actually
well designed to provide a measure of deterrence. The aggrieved party, who may decide
against which commercial sector to impose trade restrictions, is most likely to choose
one with significant domestic political clout. That way the target government will be
placed under maximum internal pressure to adhere to its trade obligations.
Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., Enforcing Restraint (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign
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Relations, 1993). For a piece devoted specifically to the problem of collective punishment and the Iraqi sanctions regime, see Michael Sklaire, Note, "The Security Council
Blockade of Iraq: Conflicting Obligations under the United Nations Charter and the
Fourth Geneva Convention;' American University Journal of International Law and Policy, 6,1991,609,624, 635. Numerous international humanitarian law and human rights
conventions prohibit collective punishment. Among provisions in humanitarian conventions, see Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3517,
3538-3540, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 308- 10 (prohibiting punishment of a person "for an
offense he or she has not personally committed"). See also Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, Protocol I, Article 75(2)(d), International Legal Materials, 16, 1978, 1391, 1423 (prohibiting
collective punishment of persons under the control of a party to a conflict) ; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, Protocol II, Article 4(2)(B), 16 I.L.M. 1442, 1444 (prohibiting collective
punishments of persons not taking part in hostilities). See generally Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Third Session, [1991] 2(2)
Year Book of the International Law Commission 1, 104-105, UN. Doc. A/CN.4/ SER.
AI1991/Add.l (Part 2) (identifying collective punishment as an exceptionally serious
war crime) . While the term "collective punishment" is not used in international human
rights instruments, it is clearly prohibited by core provisions of such instruments.
Implicit, for example, in provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights such
as the right "to equal protection of the law" (Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Article 7, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Part 1, at 71, UN. Doc. A/810 (1948)
[hereinafter UDHR]), the right to be free of arbitrary arrest, detention, or execution
(UDHR, Article 9) and the right "to be presumed innocent until proved guilty"
(UDHR, Article 11) is that individuals should not be held accountable for wrongdoings
that they did not commit. Other major human rights instruments provide similarly.
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, note 37 here, especially Articles 6(1), 9(1),14(1)(2)(3), and 26; European Convention on the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,213 UN.T.S. 221, especially Articles
5(1)(a)(b)(c) and 6(2)(3); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123, International Legal Materials, 9,1971, especially Article 5(3) ("punishment shall not be extended to any person other than the criminal").
See, e.g., Bruce Russett and James Sutterlin, "The U.N. in a New World Order;' Foreign
Affairs, Spring 1991,69,75.
Estimates of the number of Iraqi soldiers killed have varied widely. The Pentagon's
Defense Intelligence Agency estimated in 1991 (with a self-proclaimed error factor of
fifty percent or higher) that approximately 100,000 Iraqi military personnel were killed
in action. See Barton Gellman, "One Year Later: War's Faded Triumph; Oil Flows, but
Saddam Endures and New World Order Is Elusive," Washington Post, Jan. 16, 1992, AI.
Other subsequent estimates have been much lower. See U.S. News & World Report, Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War (New York:
Times Books, 1992), ix (estimating that approximately 8,000 Iraqis were killed); John
Heidenrich, "The Gulf War: How Many Iraqis Died?" Foreign Policy, Spring 1993, 108,
124 (arguing that number killed may have been as low as 1,500).
See Julian Borger, "Iraq: The Next Moves: Saddam's Elite Rides High Despite UN.
Sanctions;' Guardian, Mar. 3,1998, 12.
See Alan Dowty, "Sanctioning Iraq: The Limits of the New World Order," Washington
Quarterly, Summer 1994, 179 (reporting that the post-Gulf War U.N. sanctions regime

have had "considerable impact on Iraq [in economic terms] without producing the
desired political effect").
44. See Sarah Zaidi and Mary Smith-Fawzi, The Lancet, 346, 1995, 1485 (reporting on the
1995 Food and Agricultural Organization study finding that post-Gulf War sanctions
were responsible for the deaths of 567,000 Iraqi children); Barbara Crossette, "Unicef
Head Says Thousands of Children are Dying in Iraq;' New York Times, Oct. 29, 1996, A8
(reporting that, according the 1995 UNICEF report, 4,500 children under the age of
five were dying every month in Iraq from hunger and disease). These figures have been
very controversial. The question has been highly politicized and the methodologies in
these studies have been questioned, along with their reliance on official Iraqi information sources. See George Lopez and David Cortright, "Counting the Dead;' Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists, May/June 1998,39. Whatever the exact number of dead, however, it
has been clear to all observers that the Iraqi sanctions regime has inflicted tremendous
hardship on the Iraqi civilian population.
45. See generally Martti Koskenniemi, "The Place of Law in Collective Security," Michigan
Journal of International Law, 17, 1996, 455.
46. See S.c. Res. 678, 263 mtg., International Legal Materials, 29, 1990, 1565.
47. Other countries participating under United States command are Australia, Belgium,
Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. See Barbara Crossette, "illegal
Iraqi Oil Shipments Increase, U.S. Says;' New York Times, Nov. 19, 1997, A8. While the
post-Gulf War weapons inspectors, who were responsible for monitoring Iraqi compliance with the requirement that it eliminate its weapons of mass destruction, worked
for the United Nations, even they found themselves relying heavily upon national intelligence agencies for information. See generally Scott Ritter, End Game: Solving the Iraq
Problem-Once and for All (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999).
48. Among such proposals has been one to establish a small standing army under the auspices of the United Nations. See David Boren, "The World Needs an Army on Call;'
New York Times, Aug. 26,1992, A21; Alan K. Henrikson, "How Can the Vision of a 'New
World Order' Be Realized;' Fletcher Forum World Affairs, Winter 1992, 63, 76; Editorial,
"A Foreign Legion for the World," New York Times, Sept. 1, 1992, A16.
49. See generally Falk and Strauss, "On the Creation." In many ways the present analysis
takes up where that paper leaves off. The central aim of our joint work is to argue that
civil society is now capable (hopefully with the help of certain progressive states) of
founding the Global Peoples Assembly, and that because this assembly would have a
basis in popular legitimacy, it would, despite its unofficial origins, have the potential to
playa major role in global governance.
50. See generally Robert Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1998); David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995).
51. This is, of course, not true everywhere, but the movement toward the belief and practice, although imperfect, of electoral democracy in domestic settings is unmistakable.
52. See Falk and Strauss, "On the Creation."
53. For a case study of the functioning of democratic structures that has become a classic
in the study of pluralism, see Robert Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an
American City (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961).
54. See Falk and Strauss, "On the Creation."
55. Of course, the greater the judicial acceptance, the more litigants would begin to make
such arguments, which would in turn lead to greater judicial acceptance.
56. There is some empirical evidence indicating the potential for such acceptance. Some
courts have given legal force to resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.
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While the General Assembly is composed of almost all of the countries, its formal powers under the United Nations Charter are largely precatory. For further elaboration, see
Falk and Strauss, "On the Creation." The Global Peoples Assembly would be more truly
democratic than the General Assembly and, of course, more connected to the citizenry.
Falk and I, therefore, conclude that its authority has far more potential for acceptance.
See ibid.
For further elaboration, see John Pinder, ed., Foundations ofDemocracy in the European
Union: From the Genesis of Parliamentary Democracy to the European Parliament (London: Palgrave, 1999).
See Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking
and Fragmenting World (London: Edward Elgar, 1992) (discussing the limitations of
national political solutions to the global problems of today).
For a discussion of the protest at Seattle's WTO meeting, see e.g., Juliette Beck and
Kevin Danaher, Editorial, "Is the WTO a Blessing or a Curse?" San Francisco Chronicle,
Nov. 29,1999, A25.
For a discussion of subsidiarity, see Denis Edwards, "Fearing Federalism's Failure: Subsidiarity in the European Union," American Journal of Comparative Law, 44,1996,537.
See also George A. Bermann, "Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States;' Columbia Law Review, 94,1994,331.
Of course, differences of opinion would present themselves as to exactly how the subsidiarity principle should be applied in concrete situations. This has been the case in
Europe and even the United States, where debates about federalism have recurrently
surfaced.
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.. .."
U.N. Charter, Article 2, Paragraph 7.
UDHR; note 39.

